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I. Introduction 
The election of Señora Violeta Chamorro in February 1990, as the Presi- 
dent of Nicaragua, has been understood as part of the aluvial tide running in 
favor of democracy throughout the world. In Washington, the administration of 
President George Bush, as surprised by the results as most observers, welcomed 
the outcome as the final vindication of the policy of Ronald Reagan in Central 
America. To many observers in the United States and in Latin America, that 
posture appeared disengenuous because for the better part of a decade, the U.S. 
government had appeared much more concerned with the presence of Cuban 
and Soviet influence in Nicaragua than with the possibilities for democracy 
there. Certainly, the manner in which democracy as a policy goa1 was subordi- 
nated to other goals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the manner 
in which an armed insurgency against the government of Nicaragua was provi- 
ded overt and covert support under the justification of anti-communism, sug- 
gested that ((democracy)) was nothing more than a club or weapon that the 
United States would use whenever convenient against regimes it considered 
hostile, in its ongoing struggle with the Soviet Union. In Central America, it was 
a device to counter what the United States decried as the threat of externa1 
intervention in the region. 
Given the experience of the past ten years, it is hard to imagine that the U.S. 
government on several occasions in the 20th century fervently supported the 
cause of democracy in Nicaragua and, by explicity supporting the government 
there, played a constructive though paternalistic role in the effort to extend the 
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reach and deepen the substance of democracy. That was the care during the 
first administration of Woodrow Wilson (1 9 13- 19 17) and the administration of 
Warren G. Harding (1921-1923). Indeed, it is harder, still, to imagine the time 
when the U.S. government did not play any significant role in the interna1 affairs 
of Nicaragua. And, yet, such was the case during most of the 19th century. 
Perhaps it is hardest to realize that the policy of the United States toward Nicara- 
gua has gone through a number of important chaages and that the government 
in Washington, when it first turned its attention to events in Nicaragua during 
the administration of William Howard Taft (1909- 19 13), was uncertain how to 
act and uncertain how to achieve its goals. A review of the history of U.S. rela- 
tions with Nicaragua in the twentieth century prior to the Sandinista accession 
to power in 1979 is extremely useful in understanding the evolution of the 
concept of democracy in U.S. foreing policy thinking and how changes in that 
concept affected relations between the two countries. It is useful also in ena- 
bling us to see more clearly how U.S. policymakers have viewed democracy as 
an export commodity and how the defense of democracy may be used to this 
day as the rationalization for armed intervention in the affairs of another state, 
as in the invasion of Panama in December 1989. 
Recounting the history of U.S. intervention becomes a morality play that 
suggests compellingly that democracy as an export commodity tends to be long 
on form and short on substance, that in attempting to impose the trappings of 
democratic government on Nicaragua over the years, the U.S. government has 
made little attempt to consider the needs, concerns, or interests of the Nicara- 
guan people; and, that efforts to impose democracy, even when limited to cons- 
titutional form and elections, never succeeded in establishing stable democra- 
tic conditions in the country. The history of U.S. efforts to impose democratic 
government on Nicaragua suggests also that there has operated an iron law of 
intervention under which a little intervention in the domestic affairs of another 
nation, for the purpose of imposing a certain kind of government o i  a certain 
pattern of political behavior, leads inexorably to more intervention. The iron 
law operates unti1 and unless the U.S. government explicity decides to limit its 
intervention and to give up the policy objective of forcing democracy on the 
intervened people. At that moment, the political forces in Nicaragua return to 
their traditional patterns of behavior in which governance is organized by per- 
sonalistic deals rather than by free expression of the popuLar will and which 
power is considered a zero-sum game, not to be shared or given up except 
under force. Nicaragua is a penetrated political system in which the U.S. go- 
vernment is a vital actor, passive or active, to be appealed to by Nicaraguan 
actors for the purpose of achieving or maintaining control over the govern- 
ment. In the current cycle, the Nicaraguan actors appear to know their roles 
very well. At this writing, it remains to be seen how the United States will 
respond and whether the Nicaraguans will be capable of sustaining a pluralistic 
democratic policy that is responsive to the needs of the Nicaraguan people 
without the suffocating tutelage of the United States. 
11. Historical Background 
Those in the United States given to sabre rattling south of the border and 
those in Latin America given to U.S.-bashing tend to forget or deny that the 
United States was not always paramount in Nicaraguan affairs. The United Sta- 
tes had attempted to project its power in the region in the 19th century, but to 
little effect. The filibustering of William Walker in the 1850s was the only excep- 
tion and the U.S. government played little or no role in the episode. Great 
Britain had been the dominant power in the region throughout the 19th cen- 
tury, and by the end of the century, the United States had succeeded barely in 
neutralizing British power, not in eliminating it. Nicaragua had figured in Uni- 
ted States policy as the site of a potential isthmian canal. As early as the 1880s, 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan had referred to the isthmus as critica1 to United 
States national security. In the early years of the 1890s, the best route for the 
canal and the role of the U.S. government in its construction was a subject of 
political debate in the congress and among those concerned with U.S. foreing 
policy. For several years, the route through Nicaragua was preferred by a majo- 
rity in congress and it was only through concerted effort by the lobby favoring a 
route through the Colombian province of Panama and the separatist movement 
there that turned attention in the United States away from Nicaragua.' 
The United States achieved its hegemonic dominance in the Caribbean 
basin in the years between the war with Spain and the First World War. The key 
to understanding U.S. policy in the area during this period is the nature of 
United States policy objectives - eliminating the conditions that prompted ex- 
ternal intervention by European powers, such as fiscal irresponsibility and poli- 
tical instability - and the evolving debate within the government over the ap- 
propriate means by which it would accomplish its goals in each intervention in 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. 
In this early period, the United States shifted from a reactive policy toward 
European intervention in the Caribbean bastin to a proactive interventionist 
policy. The first step in this process came during the so-called Venezuelan debt 
crisis of 1902, in which the government of Theodore Roosevelt explicitly gave 
permission to the other ((civilized,, nations, as they were called in those days, 
and the governments representing the holders of the bonds on which the Vene- 
zuelan government had defaulted, to ((policen the area by using force to extract 
payment from the Venezuelan government. Public opinion and congress reac- 
ted immediately with a passion that surprised Roosevelt, forcing him to ask the 
Germans, who had dispatched a naval force to the coast of Venezuela, to speed 
up their civilizing mission and get out of the Caribbean. Worse, an international 
tribunal in The Hague seized with a dispute among Venezuela's creditors regar- 
ding how the debts should be repaid, found in favor of the creditors who had 
taken the trouble to send ships to the region to force resumption of pay- 
ments. 
When a similar episode occurred in 1904, in the Dominican Republic, Pre- 
sident Roosevelt knew he could not allow the European creditors to step in. The 
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United States would have to assume the responsability of the policeman of 
civilized nations in order to keep the Europeans out. As he told his son in 
February 1904, ccThe United States should assume an attitude of protection and 
regulation in regard to all those little states in the neighborhood of the Carib- 
bean., Later the same month, he told a friend, ccIt is our duty, when it becomes 
absolutely inevitable, to police these countries in the interests of order and civi- 
lization.), * 
The Congress was not certain it wanted to assume an imperial role in the 
sense that such roles had been assumed by the European nations. When the 
executive proposed a formal treaty in 1905 to certify the United States activity in 
the Dominican Republic, the congress balked. Roosevelt, himself, was uncer- 
tain as to how to proceed. On one thing, however, he was clear. At the end of the 
year, as the government discussed its options in the Dominician Republic, he 
told Secretary of State Elihu Root, c e 1  have about as much desire to take over 
more territory as does a gorged boa constrictor to swallow a porcupine hind 
end to.), 
Thus, the United States approached its first military intervention in Nicara- 
gua in the context of defining its role as a great power. The nation's leaders were 
confident that they could and should assume such a role but, aside from rejec- 
ting the territorial implications of empire, they had not defined carefully what 
their responsabilities as a hegemonic power might entail. They knew that their 
basic objective had to be to prevent European intervention in the Caribbean. 
There was a sense that lapses in international behavior by nations in the region, 
especially those involving international debets, created the conditions for inter- 
vention and that such intervention was justified under international law. In 
order to prevent intervention by the European powers, the United States would 
have to act to teach the lessons of civilized international behavior to their client 
states. What this might mean was anything but clear in the thinking of U.S. po- 
1icymake1-s.4 
111. Enter Nicaragua 
Nicaragua had made little progress in nation building in the seventy-five 
years since Spanish authority had been overthrown. During most of the 19th 
century, the central government was in the hands of one or another of the 
regional barons who, calling themselves Liberals or Conservatives, dominated 
society and economics around León, in the north, or Granada, in the central 
south. These bosses, cattle barons and mercants, were caudillos in the classical 
mold of 19th century Latin America. Their power was regional but within their 
region, it was virtually without significant limitations. No formal institutions, 
local or national, curbed the power of these caudi l lo~.~ 
2. Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, p. 235. 
3. Ibid, vol. 3, p. 463. 
4. See E. R. May, American Imperialism: An Interpretative Essay (NY: Atheneum, 1973) for a 
synthesis of the contemporary debate over the nature of U.S. imperialism. 
5. For a general discussion of the 19th century in Central America, see R.L. Woodward, Jr., 
Central America: A Nation Divided (NY: Oxford University Press, 1976). For a discussion of caudillis- 
In truth, the central government had very little authority over a national 
territory that was defined only in the most imprecise manner. National bounda- 
ries had not been fixed at the time of independence and their location was a 
question of elite politics, something for the regional bosses to fight over but 
which had little or no symbolic meaning for the nation. To make matters worse, 
the east coast was virtually cut off hom the central plateau and the west coast. 
There, the British were all but sovereign, English was the dominant language, 
and the population was Afro-Caribbean and Indian, not mestizo or Indian of the 
highland tribes. As a consequence of this legacy, there was a marked lack of 
national cohesion throughout the century characterized by remarkably primiti- 
ve communications. There was very little state formation and no attempt to 
make of the central government anything more than the symbolic prize of war- 
fare among the regional caudillos. At the same time, the lack of state formation 
and. lack of definition of the national territory led to a pattern of meddling 
across international boundaries throughout the region. It was common for cau- 
dillos to meddle in the affairs of their aillies or enemies even though they might 
be in a land called Guatemala, or Costa Rica, or Honduras. 
So weak was the national state, that a filibusterer hom the United States, 
William Walker, invaded Nicaragua in 1855 with an army of mercenaries, un- 
der contract with the Liberals. to h e l ~  them oust the Conservatives. First. he was 
military chief under a puppet reg i i e  and then, in 1856, he declared himself 
president of the republic. The British provided financial support for a coalition 
of Conservative forces in the region who managed to oust Walker in 1857. The 
Liberals were so discredited by their alliance with Walker that the Conservati- 
ves held power unti1 1893, when the Liberals managed to install their leader, 
José Santos Zelaya, as head of the national government. 
Zelaya's subsequent anti-clerical policies and persecution of the Conserva- 
tive faction subjected his government to constant insurrections by his oppo- 
nents. The Conservative revolt against Zelaya in 1909 was the fourteenth during 
his rule. In this case, however, it upset the U.S. Department of State because it 
threatened the property and lives of foreigners and contained the potential to 
provoke foreing intervention, which the United States was determined to fores- 
tall. To ameliorate his financial difficulties, Zelaya previously had tried to se11 
the rights to a canal route across Nicaraguan territory to interests in Europe and 
Japan. This did not sit well in Washington either, and the agents of the U.S. 
Government in Nicaragua exerted their best efforts to eliminate Zelaya and 
install in his place general Juan Estrada, a dissident Liberal leader who had 
thrown his lot in with the Conservatives. 
In intervening to tip the scales in favor of the Conservatives, the Depart- 
ment of State ex~ected to reDeat what thev considered to be their success in 
preventing European intervention in the Dominican Republic by restoring the 
conditions of fiscal responsability. At this point, little mention of politics was 
made in setting the terms of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. After the fall of the 
Zelaya faction in 1910, the U.S. government sent financial advisers to Managua 
to help president Estrada straighten out his government's budget. This action 
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was consistent with the U.S. policy of dollar diplomacy elsewhere in the worl- 
d,under which U.S. capital was expected to become .the instrumentality to 
secure financial stability and hence prosperity and peace in the region.)) 
To accomplish its limited objectives, the State Department solicited sup- 
port from investment banking houses in New York to consolidate Nicaragua's 
foreing debt and pay off the European bondholders, thereby eliminating the 
threat of European intervention. At the same time, the Department presented a 
treaty to Congress under which the United States would guarantee loans to 
Nicaragua and help end the fiscal irresponsability that had become an interna- 
tional embarrassment. Much to the consternation of the Taft administration, 
Congress rejected the treaty in 19 10. 
At this point, the bankers already were committed to proceed with the 
consolidation loan and the State Department gave them informal assurances 
that they could expect government support for their activities. But in 1911, 
Estrada was replaced in a bloodless coup by Adolfo Diaz, a Conservative. Ten- 
sion increased unti1 the political situation collapsed completely the following 
year. Fearing that they could not get a fair dea1 in the upcoming congressional 
elections, both Liberals and Conservatives prepared for an armed conflict, as 
they had so many times in the past. This time it would be different because the 
U.S. government was committed to maintaining stability in the region and was 
unwilling to accept the traditional pattern of inter-elite conflict in Nicaragua. 
At Diaz' request, marines landed in August 1912 to protect U.S. lives and 
property and restore order. When they departed in November, they left behind 
a Legation Guard of 100 soldiers. This was the first time the U.S. government 
had used troops to restore order and bolster the established government of a 
Latin American nation. It would not be the last. 
The nature of U.S. imperial responsibilities in the western hemisphere 
changed as a result of this episode. Now, there was a presence of U.S. marines to 
support the constituted government and prevent the usual play of violence in 
the change of national authorities. The man who directed the Legation Guard, 
the U.S. minister, became the arbiter and mediator of Nicaraguan politics, con- 
sulted by leaders of both major factions, by ministers of the national govern- 
ment, and by leaders of the national congress concerned about pending legisla- 
tion. The role of this proconsul was expanded as a consequence of the world 
economic downturn that cut back on revenues earned by the Nicaraguan go- 
vernment through customs receipts, now collected by an agent of the U.S. go- 
vernment. At the end of 1912, the Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nicaragua, the 
national railway, became collatera1 for the consolidated loan held in New York. 
In 1913, the same fate befell the National Bank. Both became U.S. corporations 
administered by boards that met in New York City. 
In many ways, some of them totally unanticipated by Washington when it 
first posed the option of intervention in Nicaraguan affairs, the U.S. government 
had become an actor in Nicaraguan politics in a manner that would make it 
difíicult to distingish politics in a manner that would make it difíicult to distin- 
6 .  Quoted in LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 23. For a detailed account of these events, and 
a very different interpretation from the one offered by LaFeber, see Dana G .  Munro, Dollar Diplomacy 
and United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1900- 1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964). 
gish between interna1 and externa1 influences. Factions in Nicaragua and the 
Nicaraguan government itself began to play to the U.S. government in an effort 
to increase their leverage within the Nicaraguan political system. Still, in 1909, 
the nature of the government in Nicaragua had not become an issue of U.S. 
u u 
policy; stability, not democracy, was the issue. 
When Wilson became president in March 1913 he began immediately to 
fulfill one of his campaing promises to end dollar diplomacy. His first target was 
the consortium of bankers intent on using U.S. government influence to make 
major loans to China. His Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was a 
longstanding critic of Wall Street and greedy capitalism. Yet neither man for a 
moment questioned the basic goa1 of avoiding European intervention in the 
Caribbean, nor the assumptions underlying the need to protect U.S. strategic 
interest in the Caribbean by avoiding the conditions that might precipitate fo- 
reign intervention. 
Confronted with the critica1 Nicaraguan situation of 19 13, Bryan first tried 
to get the Senate to ratify the Knox-Castrillo Convention which contained an 
option for the United States to build a canal across Nicaraguan territory and a 
clause similar to the Platt Amendment giving the U.S. government authority to 
rnaintain order and fiscal equilibrium in Nicaragua. To his dismay, the Senate 
reiected the convention because it was unwilling to assume the im~eria l  res- 
" 
pinsabilities it implied. 
Bryan then renegotiated the agreement, now called the Bryan-Chamorro 
Treaty. In place of the explicit assumption of imperial responsability. Bryan 
proposed a scheme that anticipated the multilateral lending agencies after 
World War 11. He suggested that the United States Treasury float loans on the 
domestic market at 3-4 % and then lend Nicaragua the money it needed at 
5-6 O/o, significantly under the market rate of 9-10 % for such poor risks as the 
Nicaraguan government. The U.S. government would use the difference to 
amortize the loan. Agents appointed by the U.S. government would advise the 
Nicaraguan government on the disposition of the loan funds and help in the 
collection of revenues in ~icaragua.  
Now, it was Wilson who rejected the scheme, on the grounds that it would 
commit the United States to unnecessary involvement in Nicaragua domestic 
affairs. Yet, just one month later, to keep Nicaragua solvent, Bryan was forced 
to approve the loan contract negotiated by Brown Brothers in October 1913 
under which the U.S. government appointed two members of the board of the 
National Bank. As a result, all disputed with the Nicaraguan government auto- 
matically became diplomatic disputes involving the government of the United 
States. The involvement of the U.S. government in Nicaraguan domestic affairs 
had become complete. This financially induced involvement was broken only 
by the export boom after World War I which enabled Nicaragua to pay off its 
longstanding loans and get rid of the offensive U.S. agents. In the period from 
19 17 to 1929,43 % of total government outlays went to cover public debt com- 
mitments. The debt crisis of the 1980s was triffling by comparison. 
Wilson was not content to be drawn into the domestic affairs of Nicaragua 
as the satrapy of New York bankers. At the time he was discussing events in 
Managua with Bryan, the two men were deeply involved in the unfolding drama 
of the Mexican Revolution. There, as well as in the Dominican Republic, Wilson 
was convinced that the U.S. government had a constructive role to play in 
After the war, Wilson was convinced that the threat of European interven- 
tion in the hemisphere had all but disappeared. He also was disillusioned with 
his efforts to implant democracy in Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua. As a consequence, he was determined to reduce the intervention by 
the United States in the domestic affairs of nations in the Western Hemisphere. 
In Nicaragua, that meant accepting the form of democracy while conscious that 
its substance was being violated. In the elections of 1920, Chamorro manipula- 
ted the rules to insure the election of his uncle, Diego Chamorro, while he 
remained the power behind the president. The State Department held its collec- 
tive nose and publicly accepted the hollow shell of electoralism in order to 
avoid deeper intervention in Nicaraguan affairs. 
The succeeding Republican administration adopted and extended Wilson's 
postwar reluctance to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Latin American 
nations. So long as the form of democracy was maintained, the State Depart- 
ment sought to ramain above the local fray, no matter how dirty it might beco- 
me.lo As Paul Drake explains clearly in another chapter in this volume, the 
political factions in Nicaragua continued to use the U.S. government as a player 
in domestic politics as they had for years.ll Each was prepared to do whatever 
was necessary to precipitate U.S. intervention on their behalf because that was 
the only way they could have access to power. Without such intervention, either 
in the form of suasion and pressure by the local representative of the U.S. go- 
vernment or by the threat of force from officials in Washington, it was impossi- 
ble to effect a peaceful change in control of the central government. Even 
Augusto C. Sandino, a Liberal who opposed Chamorro and would become the 
father of Nicaraguan antidmerican nationalism, started out wanting elections, 
supervised elections. His innovation was to request supervision by Latin Ameri- 
can observers, not by gringos. 
The State Department tried to counter the idiosyncracies of Nicaraguan 
political culture by imposing additional reforms, correcting the abuses of de- 
mocracy's substance or spirit with more procedures. The Nicaraguans adapted 
to them. In 1923, the so-called Dodds Law was imposed on the Nicaraguan 
government, creating for the first time an explicit requirement for bipartisan 
politics. This law was drawn up initially by a U.S. professor of political science, 
Harold Dodds, under contract by the State Department. After some discreet 
pressure on the Nicaraguan government by the U.S. ambassador and some mi- 
nor changes in the draft version, the electoral law went into effect in 1923 and 
remained on the books with some amendments unti1 the 1960s. While the law 
allowed any political grouping to become a party by submitting a petition sig- 
ned by a number of citizens equivalent to 5 % of the total number of votes cast in 
the previous election, in fact the law institutionalized the two-party system by 
reserving all appointments to electoral posts to members of the majority parties 
(i.e. the Liberals and the Conservatives). Not only that, but the majority of offi- 
cials at the various levels of the electoral machinery would be chosen from the 
ranks of the party in power at the time. With this control of the electoral pro- 
cess, the party in power could proceed easily to disqualify voters from the other 
10. See Tulchin, op. cif . ,  chapters 3 and 7. 
1 1 .  See the chapter by Paul Drake in this volume. 
exporting democracy to countries that wanted it but were somehow unable to 
establish democratic governments without the assistance of the U.S. govern- 
ment. In the case of Nicaragua, Wilson undertook to revise the constitution and 
take steps to insure the fairness of the coming elections in 1916. For the first 
time, the achievement of democratic government and the projection of demo- 
cratic process became an explicit feature of U.S. policy towards Nicaragua, 
always as a means to secure the basic policy goal: to prevent European interven- 
tion by eliminating the conditions that made it possible. 
While it is fruitless to debate Wilson's motives in attempting to export de- 
mocracy to Nicaragua - it seems clear, as Arthur Link has argued, that Wilson 
believed a democratic form of government would erihance the quality of life for 
all Nicaraguans, and it is just as clear that Wilson understood that the imposi- 
tion of democracy on Nicaragua would enhance U.S. security and expand its 
influence in the region - it is remarkable that he adopted so limited a concep- 
tion of democracy in the export version and that he never for a moment questio- 
ned whether the governmental institutions and procedures he was prepared to 
export to Nicaragua would have to be adapted in any way, shape or form, to fit 
the local milieu.' It was as if he believed that democracy was democracy, and 
that it could be exported to another country without any alteration whatsoever, 
without reference to the historical or cultural context in which it had envolved 
and, that honest local politicians would behave in a fully democratic manner if 
only they could be taught what it was. This cultural ethnocentrism and the 
certitude that accompanied it is the very essence of what we mean today by a 
ccwilsonian a t t i t~de , .~  
As it turned out, the Nicaraguans adapted the mechanisms of democracy to 
their own political culture with amazing virtuosity. In the run-up to the election 
of 1916, both factions, the Liberals and the Conservatives, complained to the 
U.S. minister that their opponents were violating certain laws and using illegal 
campaing methods and that their control of the press in their regional baili- 
wicks violated the letter and the s ~ i r i t  of the constitution. Emiliano Chamorro. 
the Conservative caudillo and prisidential candidate, proved more adept tha* 
his opponent in manipulating the new instruments of democracy in building a 
coalition that looked remarkably like the old-fashioned alliances based on re- 
gional loyalties. Chamorro mastered the new procedures by adapting them to 
traditional Nicaraguan political culture. He manipulated the situation with 
such skill that the electoral agents sent to Nicaragua by the State Department 
virtually guarenteed his election. As further demonstration that he understood 
U.S. political culture much better than any North Americans understood Nica- 
ragua's, he created the first institutional, legally recognized lobby of a Latin 
American nation in Washington, hiring Chandler P. Anderson to represent the 
interests of the Nicaraguan government. Time would prove Anderson a very 
effective 10bbyist.~ 
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parties, count the ballots to its advantage, and in general make it impossible for 
a contender to mount a successful electoral challenge.12 
It should come as no surprise that after 1923, with but two exceptions, no 
opposition party ever came to occupy the executive office of government by 
means of an electoral process. The first exception took place in 1928 when the 
United States Marines supervised the registration and voting procedures that 
enabled José Maria Moncada, the Liberal presidential candidate, to defeat Adol- 
fo Diaz, the Conservative politician who owed the United States his entire politi- 
cal career. The second was in 1990, when an army of civilian observers patro- 
lled the polling places and an opposition force, armed by the United States, 
camped in the countryside and across the border in Honduras. Moncada's vic- 
tory was assured by the settlement imposed by President Coolidge's special 
emissary Henry Stimson to end the brief civil war between Conservatives and 
Liberals in 1927. Frustrated by their inability to win power through elections, 
the Liberals had resorted to the traditional device of an armed rebellion, hoping 
to drag the United States into the fray. Reluctantly, Coolidge intervened, but he 
ordered Stimson to do the job as quickly as possible and get out. Only Sandino 
objected to the terms of the arrangement Stimson negotiated and proceeded to 
fight the Marines from his strongholds in the north of the country. The U.S. 
government would not withdraw the Marines unti1 the country was pacified. To 
accomplish its purpose, it adopted the advice of the Marine commander and 
created a local ((professional police force, to keep order. Thus was born the 
Guardia Nacional. 
The international environment in which the U.S. dispatched the Marines to 
Nicaragua in 1927 had changed in severa1 important ways after World War I, 
affecting the manner in which democracy was used as an instrument of policy. 
While the decline in European capacity to intervene in the Caribbean as a result 
of the war certainly enhanced United States power and security, thereby dimi- 
nishing the need for intervention, the nationalism characteristic of European 
politics of the era began to permeate Latin America as well. U.S. meddling in 
Nicaragua exacerbated the ongoing crisis in U.S. relations with Mexico.13 The 
new revolutionary government in Mexico was determined to counter U.S. in- 
fluence in the region and made its voice heard with increasing effect during the 
decade. The U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and the subsequent war between 
the Sandinistas and the Marines prompted the first concerted effort by Latin 
American nations to denounce and curtail U.S. hegemony when they met at the 
1928 Pan American Conference in Havana. The fact that the intervention was 
justified by Washington in terms of protecting democracy did not move the 
critics at Havana. Nevertheless, the need to appear as the defender of demo- 
cracy became even more useful to U.S. policymakers at the end of the decade, 
when then Secretary of State Stimson tried to emphasize the distinction bet- 
ween Japanese actions in Manchuria and the way in which the United States 
operated in Latin America. Democracy was an instrument of foreing policy, to 
be used against rival powers outside the hemisphere. It was no longer an objec- 
tive in its own right, as it had been for Woodrow Wilson.14 
12. The text of the law is in La Gaceta/Diario oficial, vol. 27, Nos. 71-74 (March 3-6, 1923). 
13. Richard Salisbuty, Conflict in Central America (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
1989). 
14. It is worth noting that the leader of the Marine force in Nicaragua, Srnedley Butler was 
IV. The Somoza Years 
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president of the United States in 
March 1933, there were indications that his administration would return to the 
interventionism in Latin American affairs that had characterized the first admi- 
nistration of Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt himself had been involved in the oc- 
cupation of Haiti, as Assistant Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull, was an avowed Wilsonian in his belief in the universal applicability of 
democratic norms, and the administration's chief Latin American expert, Un- 
dersecretary of States Sumner Welles, had been deeply involved in the efforts 
during the Harding and Coolidge administrations to implant democracy in the 
Dominican Republic. Soon after Roosevelt's inauguration, in which the presi- 
dent had declared his special interest in Latin America by promising a policy of 
the Good Neighbor, Welles went to Cuba to ensure a smooth transition to demo- 
cracy following the overthrow of the cruel dictator Gerardo Machado. Caught 
up in the factional infighting, Welles soon found himself forced to escalate his 
threats of intervention in order to encourage the various players to follow the 
straight and narrow path to democracy. Increasingly frustrated, Welles finally 
called for military intervention to bring order to Havana. Roosevelt and Hull 
refused and Welles was forced to retract his threats and swallow Batista as the 
strongman who would impose order. The U.S. government had resisted the 
temptation to get caught in the quicksand of intervention in the interna1 affairs 
of a client state in the Caribbean basin. A few months later, at the Inter- 
American Meeting at Montevideo, Hull could accept a motion condemning 
intervention with only a mild reservation that international law might permit 
intervention under certain circumstances. Three years later, at the special mee- 
ting in Buenos Aires, Hull would accept a similar motion without reservations. 
The Latin American pressure against intervention of any kind was growing 
more insistent, to the point that the Roosevelt administration considered it a 
logical feature of the evolving Good Neighbor policy.15 
The effects of the Good Neighbor policy on U.S. relations with Nicaragua 
are clear in the episode in which Anastasi0 Somoza Garcia took power in Nica- 
ragua. Somoza Garcia never hid his presidential arnbitions from the moment 
the commanding U.S. general turned over the control of the Guardia Nacional 
to him. But he was very careful to respect the democratic and legal guidelines 
set ddownjn the Dodds kaw and the Nicaraguan constitution. By gradually win- 
ning over the national legislature and putting his own followers into key posi- 
tions in the Guardia Nacional, he was ready in 1936 to force the resignation of 
president Juan Bautista Sacasa, his wife's uncle, and capture the leadership of 
the Liberal party.16 The entire procedure allowed Somoza to reach his goal at 
convinced that he was fighting to bring democracy to the country and that Sandino was an obstacle to 
the achievement of that goal. Correspondence cited in James B. McKenna, ~Srnedley Butler in 
Nicaragua)), unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author. See, also, Neill Macaulay, The 
Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1967). 
15. This period is described in detail in Bryce Wood, The Making o f  the Good Neighbor Policy 
(NY: Colurnbia University Press, 1961). 
16. For a detailed account of Somoza's rise to power, see Richard Millett, Guardians of the 
Dynasty (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977). 
the beginning of 1937 with a rninimum of bloodshed and just a little bending of 
the law. Somoza Garcia emerged, thus, as a president elected with apparent 
bi-partisan support, the first of a series of similar arrangements that the Somo- 
zas would organize in the future. Strictly speaking, no law had been broken 
openly but the pressure and intimidation exercised by Somoza and his Guardia 
Nacional. toeether with his control of the state bank and Guardia funds, enabled 
, " 
him to persuade and threaten his way into the ofice of the presidency. 
The cables from the U.S. legation in Managua indicate that the State Depart- 
ment was aware of what was going on. Moreover, in tried and true Nicaraguan 
tradition, the Conservatives who had refused to participate in the election and 
the Liberals who had been turned out of office after Sacasa's forced resignation 
organized a delegation that went straight to Washington to complain to the 
State Department about the disguised coup d'etat that had taken place and the 
phony elections that were coming up. To their surprise and dismay, the State 
Department officials told the unhappy politicians that the interna1 affairs of 
Nicaragua were the responsability of the Nicaraguans themselves and that the 
United States would do nothing.17 
Although, in retrospect, it is clear that the United States could have threate- 
ned to act under the treaty signed in 1923 that forbade the recognition of go- 
vernment that came to power by force, or it could have hozen the assets of the 
National Bank of Nicaragua held in U.S. accounts, or that it even could have 
invoked the treaty of 1928 that created the Guardia Nacional as an apolitical, 
non-partisan body, it is not clear that any of those efforts would have had the 
desired result. Welles, who had learned a bitter lesson in Havana, was convin- 
ced that getting Somoza to behave in a genuinely democratic fashion would 
have required more than idle threats. It would have sucked the United States 
deep into the vortex of Nicaraguan politics. U.S. public opinion would not stand 
for military adventures in the Caribbean basin. Besides, few policymakers in 
Washington were persuaded that even massive, prolonged intervention would 
have the desired democratic effect. Not even secretary Hull, the most Wilsonian 
of the senior State Deparment officials thought imposing democracy on Nicara- 
gua was feasible or that it was worth the political risks to other New Dea1 pro- 
grams in Congress. Hull, too, had learned his lesson hom the experience in 
Cuba. He was more interested in what was happening in Europe and in getting 
the Congress to cooperate with his broad policy goals such as freer trade and 
cooperation with Great Britain in an effort to preserve peace in Europe, than he 
was in getting bogged down in the difficult task of exporting democracy to a 
nation whose leaders seemed uninterested in living by its rules and immune to 
its spirit. 
There were externa1 forces working against a policy of intervention to im- 
pose democracy on Nicaragua, or on any nation in Latin America. Escalating 
intervention by the United States in Nicaragua, even in the name of democracy, 
would alienate governments from Mexico to Argentina. The gathering storm 
clouds in Europe made running the risk of alienating potential allies in Latin 
17. The U.S. reaction to Sornoza's continuismo can be found in Foreign Relations o f  the United 
States, 1945, v. IX (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofice, 1969), pp. 1215-1230. For a discus- 
sion of elections in Nicaragua under U.S. influence, see Alvaro Arguello, ((Tres modelos de eleccio- 
nes en Nicaragua,,, Envio, No. 32. (1984.) 
America much too costly. Consolidating those ties became the top policy prio- 
rity by the end of the decade. The U.S. government even had adhered without 
reservations to a resolution at the inter-American peace conference held in 
Buenos Aires in 1936 to the effect that no state had the right to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of another. As further elaborations of this Good Neighbor po- 
licy, the United States had sought to ensure friendly relations with Mexico, 
imposing a settlement of the oi1 expropriation negotiations that the oi1 compa- 
nies considered grossly unfair.18 Consistent with the emerging policy, the Roo- 
sevelt administration sought to bolster Somoza, not undermine his rule by insis- 
ting on closer adherence to democratic norms. It invited President Somoza 
Garcia to Washington in 1939 as the official guest of President Roosevelt, inclu- 
ding a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue and a speech before the Congress. An 
initial policy of non-intervention combined with official recognition and public 
apotheosis in the U.S. capital provided Somoza Garcia with the key elements to 
consolidate his government within and without Nicaragua. 
The United States would do much the same with other dictators in the 
region. In the face of a perceived threat from outside the hemisphere, the U.S. 
government would sacrifice democracy and embrace dictators to ensure their 
support. This same policy would be employed during the Cold War, on the 
grounds that any form of government was acceptable so long as it was supporti- 
ve of the United States in its struggle against hostile forces outside the hemisp- 
here. Democracy did not disappear as a goa1 of U.S. policy in Nicaragua, or in 
other countries of the region for that matter, either in the struggle against the 
Axis or in the Cold War. There were leaders in Washington for whom the con- 
tent of the concept was as vital as the form of the procedures. The U.S. govern- 
ment continued to be concerned about the nature of democracv durine the 
government of the first Somoza and expressed that concern publ~cly on come 
occasions. Even in those moments, however, it is clear that concern for the 
purity of democracy in Nicaragua was subordinate to other national con- 
cerns. 
Somoza Garcia understood the priorities of U.S. policy and the dynamics of 
its domestic politics and manipulated them in a brazen and shrewd manner. 
During World War 11, he was quick to declare his participation in the crusade 
against the Axis. He declared war on Japan and Germany, confiscated the pro- 
perty of Axis nationals, and moved (with help from the FBI) to stem the activity 
of German agents in Nicaragua. But even he was caught in the postwar concern 
for democracy that forced Vargas hom power in Brazil and made Perón's life so 
difficult in Argentina. The wartime crusade against the Axis and the anti- 
communist crusade of the Cold War reduced foreing policy to a zero-sum game. 
((You are either with us or against us., as John Foster Dulles put it during the 
1950s. Within such a scheme, if the U.S. government feared subversion or inter- 
vention by the ccenemy), then stability and the ability and disposition to oppose 
that subversion was more important than the quality or nature of the regime. It 
was the purpose of Somoza and his allies in Washington to make sure that the 
State Department understood Somoza's support of U.S. policies within the con- 
text of that zero sum game. 
The one time he failed, in the ccsoft~ period after the war, clarifies the nature 
18. For a com~rehensive discussion of this policy, see Wood, op. cit. 
of this mechanistic calculation of policy priorities within the U.S. government. 
When Somoza made clear his intentions to remain in office past 1947, his rela- 
tions with the State Department soured noticeably. Spruille Braden, a fervent 
Wilsonian known best for his public campaing against Juan Perón in the Argen- 
tine presidential elections of 1946, tried while he was Assistant Secretary of 
State for Latin America to persuade Somoza to relinquish the presidency once 
his term expired in 1947.19 In fact, Somoza dropped his reelectionist plans and 
put forth the candidacy of Leonardo Arguello, an old Liberal whom Somoza 
thought he might control easily. Braden wanted Somoza out of the picture 
entirely to the point of even relinquishing his post as commander of the Guardia 
Nacional. When Arguello, already inaugurated as president, demanded Somo- 
za's resignation from the Guardia, he had reason to expect the United States 
would back him up. 
Somoza moved fast. He had the Nicaraguan congress declare Arguello unfit 
to occupy the presidency, appointed a new interim president, and chased Ar- 
guello into exile in Mexico. The United States responsed with the withdrawal of 
its ambassador and the commandant of the military academy and, together with 
the other nations assembled in Bogota in 1948, declared its unwillingness to 
recognize the puppet regime in Managua. For a brief while, Leonidas Trujillo of 
the Dominican Republic was the only Latin American head of state to recognize 
the Nicaraguan government. Through it all, Somoza managed to retain his un- 
disputed control over the Guardia Nacional, the bottom line of his hold on 
political power in Nicaragua and the one institution that the United States 
would not risk alienating. By this time, Braden was gone hom the government, 
and the iron zero-sum logic of anti-communism ruled in the State Department. 
Somoza's hold on power was strengthened by a number of social and eco- 
nomic changes that took place in Nicaragua after 1945.20 These changes also 
contributed to an evolution in the practice of democracy in Nicaragua. Toget- 
her, these changes, more than the passive acceptance of the U.S. government, 
help to explain the extraordinary longevity of the Somoza dynasty. First, there 
were fundamental economic changes that shifted power among elements of the 
national elite, thereby ending forever the regional factional politics that had 
characterized Nicaragua for a century. Part and parcel of these changes were a 
dramatic expansion of the state, traditionally feeble in Nicaragua, and a signifi- 
cant mobilization of popular forces, mainly through corporatist organizations 
manipulated by the state, but in some measure through unions with class cons- 
ciousness and through a number of new political groups that began to address 
specific social questions. 
These changes made Nicaragua appear a more open political system com- 
pared to the regimes in El Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala unti1 the fall of the 
Ubico dictatorship. And, if we keep in mind the Wilsonian concern for elections 
and constitutional forms and procedures that characterized the democracy-for- 
export imposed on Nicaragua by the United States in the decades prior to and 
19. For a detailed history of the Argentine episode and the debate within the U.S. government 
over democracy as a policy priority and the willingness to intervene in the affairs of Latin American 
states in order to impose democracy these see my Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted 
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Formation in Nicaragua (Chapel Hill: U N C  Press, 1991). 
following World War I, then we can understand the Somocista system as consis- 
tent with that model. The infrastructure of democracy was in place, elections 
were held, constitutional norms were followed. Of course, they were manipula- 
ted shamelessly to keep Somoza in power and to allow the opposition approved 
by the regime some room for maneuver. For example, Somoza's overthrow of 
Arguello in 1947 was followed by a heavy-handed persecution of Conservatives 
and dissident Liberals, but in anticipation of the 1950 elections, Somoza made 
sure to woo the Conservatives and have them participate in the election. The 
preelectoral agreements reached were so explicit that the distribution of elec- 
ted positions was mostly decided even before the polling took place: the Libe- 
rals and the Conservatives would be the only parties running and the Conserva- 
tives would get 17 of the 60 seats in the legislature and representation in all 
town councils. They also would get a certain number of judgeships, all in ex- 
change for participation and acceptance of the results. General Chamorro, who 
had been expelled from the country in 1947 for plotting a coup against Somoza, 
was persuaded to return and sign, with Somoza, the so-called Pact of the Gene- 
rals, which set the stage for the electoral charades of the following deca- 
des.2' 
Factors outside Nicaragua continued to have a determining impact upon 
the perception of and concern for democracy in Nicaragua by the U.S. govern- 
ment and its policy toward the regime in Managua. First, the establishment of 
pluralist democracy in Costa Rica after 1948 altered the calculation of priorities 
within U.S. policy to the detriment of Somoza; and, then, the radicalization of 
the Castro regime in Cuba after 1959 served to restore the delicate balance of 
the zero-sum game to forestall any moves in Washington to bring the Somoza 
dynasty to an end. 
Somoza Garcia had been close to deposed Costa Rican president Calderón 
Guardia and relied on him to provide a measure of international support for his 
regime. Costa Rica was one of the first to recognize Somoza's puppet president 
after the overthrow of Arguello in 1947. But as the democratic regime in San 
José was consolidated, it began to use the machinery of the OAS and the rheto- 
ric of the Cold War to ostracize Somoza and to try to push him from power. José 
Figueres made his attacks on Somoza part of a crusade for democracy and 
freedom. He joined together with other democratic colleagues in the region to 
form The Caribbean Legion with the avowed purpose of ousting all of the dicta- 
tors in the Caribbean basin. The OAS provided the military hardware necessary 
to defeat the Costa Rican rebels armed by Somoza and coming from Nica- 
ragua. 
The U.S. government was happy to have the OAS intervene and apply pres- 
sure on Somoza to cease trying to overthrow the Figueres government. It was 
embarrassed by the conflict and uncomfortable under the pressure from the 
democratic forces in the area coming as it did so soon after the militar- interven- 
tion in Guatemala to overthrow a democratic regime whose reformist policies 
were seen by the U.S. government as discriminating against U.S. capital, dange- 
rously destabilizing and subject to subversion from outside the hemisphere. The 
21. The agreement was ratified formally by the Nicaraguan congress as .Decreto convocando a 
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issue was raised whether supporting the Somoza dynasty was more destabili- 
zing than attempting to remove it. It was a delicate balance in which the more 
conservative posture in Washington was to do nothing unless concerted Latin 
American pressure made intervention a popular and necessary alternative. As 
ever, the global concerns of U.S. policy would determine the relative weight 
accorded to democracy and stability as policy goals in any given episode. 
Aside from the conflict with Costa Rica, Somoza earned high marks in 
Washington during the first Eisenhower administration. Not only did he protest 
his anti-communism loudly and often. Thanks in large measure to the strong 
prices for the country's principal exports crops, cotton and coffed, the economy 
enjoyed a prolonged period of expansion. Somoza never asked for U.S. aid, only 
trade and private investment - the perfect model for a conservative business- 
oriented administration that told Latin American leaders that the best way to 
end their region's backwardness and poverty was to open their economies to 
the magic of private entrepreneurship and foreign private i n ~ e s t m e n t . ~ ~  
The conflict with Costa Rica came to a halt temporarily with the assassina- 
tion of Anastasio Somoza in September 1956. Somoza Garcia was running for 
reelection when he was shot. There is no doubt that he would have won the 
1957 elections given the control his government exercised over the electoral 
machinery. Thus, when Luis Somoza, the elder son of Somoza Garcia, was cho- 
sen by the Nicaraguan congress to fill out the t e m  of his father, and when he 
ran unopposed as the presidential candidate in the 1957 elections, the U.S. 
government had nothing to offer but congratulations to the new head of 
state. 
The timing of the transition in Nicaragua shows a bit of Somoza luck. By the 
end of the Eisenhower administration, democracy regained some of its value as 
a to01 of U.S. policy. For the first time since the administration of Woodrow 
Wilson, the absence of democracy was considered a destabilizing factor which 
could lead to subverseion and outside influence in the area. It is instructive to 
compare the very different response of the U.S. government to the ouster of 
Batista in 1959 or the assassination of Trujillo in 1961.23 
When Kennedy was elected in 1960, a true Wilsonian disposition to export 
democracy and the conviction that democratic government was infinitely ex- 
portable and adaptable returned to U.S. policy. Now, however, it was explicitly 
tempered by a fear of the Communist menace and manipulated to undercut 
pressure in Latin America for radical change. As it had been for Wilson, demo- 
cracy was a reasonable political system that would end the appeal of more 
radical solutions to the region's p r ~ b l e m s . ~ ~  Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations tried to get the nations of Latin America involved in a struggle 
against Cuba in which the presence or absence of democracy would be a critica1 
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feature. In the case of Nicaragua, Kennedy was prepared to sacrifice Somoza, if 
necessary, but he would not act alone. He was surprised and disappointed when 
there was so little positive response from Latin American leaders. 
Luis Somoza realized that his government's good standing in Washington 
required a boost. The coffee and cotton boom of the 1950s intensified the 
growth of the export sectors and widened the gap between the rich and the 
poor. More serious to liberal critics in the United States, the Somozas had used 
the growth of the Nicaraguan economy to turn Nicaragua into a family fiefdom. 
Of greatest concern in Washington was the founding of the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FLSN) in Havana in 196 1. The FLSN made it clear that it 
would employ armed struggle to rid Nicaragua of the Somozas and that it per- 
ceived the United States as the principal cause for Nicaragua's underdevelop- 
ment. Castro was attempting to export mamist revolutlon the way the United 
States exported capitalist democracy. To observers in Havana and Washington, 
the most corrupt dictators were the most vulnerable, and the U.S. government's 
support for those dictators was a potencial cause of embarrassment. 
This combination of interna1 and externa1 events and circumstances 
prompted Luis Somoza to push for reforms along a number of lines. The regime 
decided to reform the constitution in order to allow for third party representa- 
tion in the legislature, while guaranteeing the opposition at least one third of 
the seats in the congress regardless of the electoral outcome. Control of the 
electoral machinery would remain in the hands of the government party so that 
there was no real danger of an upset. The regime also decided that it was conve- 
nient to place a nonSomoza in the presidency; the person chosen was Rene 
Schick, a long-time associate of the Somoza who had occupied a variety of posts 
in government since the 1930s and who would be completely tractable.25 After 
Schick's election in 1963, Luis Somoza stepped down to head the Liberal party 
and participate in legislative affairs. 
The government proceeded to enact the first land reform law in Central 
America since Arbenz's ill-fated attempt of the early 1950s in Guatemala. Extre- 
mely mild and cautions, the law did speak about (celevating the standard of 
living of the peasant masses,, and of redistributing land, but stopped short of 
expropriating private property unless it was totally unused and restricted the 
land reform program national lands or those purchased by the land reform 
institute. To no one's surprise, the results of land reform were quite limited. 
Agrarian policies tended to favor private export producers, especially those 
engaged in meat and cotton p r o d u c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
These political and socio-economic measures, together with others that 
sought to modernize the state's role in national development, were more than 
suficient to allow the United States to channel large amounts of AHiance for 
Progress funds to Nicaragua. Within the Alliance vision of a democratized and 
modernized Latin America, Nicaragua appeared to be doing the right things. Of 
course, Nicaragua was doing other things which were equally important for the 
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United States, such as providing unrestricted use of its territory for anti-castro 
activities (including training the troops for the Bay of Pigs invasion) and kee- 
ping a very close leash on leftist activities within Nicaragua. 
Thus, U.S. interest in democracy in Nicaragua during the 1960s was tempe- 
red and limited by security concerns which became paramount after the 
triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the increasing Soviet presence in the 
Caribbean. The Guardia Nacional, long the heart of the Somocista regime wit- 
hin Nicaragua, became the most coddled ally of the United States within the 
Central American region. The creation of the Central American Defense Coun- 
cil (CONDECA) in 1963 gave the commander of the Guardia Nacional of Nicara- 
gua an unrivaled position of influence in the entire region, as well as within 
Nicaragua. The commander of the Guardia after 1956 was Anastasi0 Somoza 
Debayle, Somoza Garcia's younger son. ((Tachiton lacked his father's sense of 
balance and his brother's political skills. These deficiencies together with 
boundless greed would be his undoing. When Luis Somoza died in 1967, Tachi- 
to ran for president in election sheld that same year. He won easily despite 
public expressions of protest which the Guardia repressed violently, leaving 
hundreds dead in the streets of Managua in January 1967. 
The Johnson administration decided not to Drotest these activities. It had 
become so concerned with Vietnam that it did no; have the collective energy to 
engage in a protracted effort to force Somoza to clean upa his act. Latin Ameri- 
can policy had come under the control of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas 
Mann, a career official whose decidedly conservative approach led to the rejec- 
tion of the pro-active thrust of the Alliance for Progress. Members of the John- 
son team felt they had been forced to intervene in the Dominican Republic in 
1965 to prevent a chaotic situation out of which groups sympathetic to Castro 
might emerge. In this context, it did not seem to make any sense to Mann and 
others to destabilize the Guardia in Nicaragua. 
In the course of the Nixon administration, as the war in Vietnam was 
brought to an end, opposition in the congress and in the public to U.S. support 
for unpopular and corrupt dictators grew in size and vehemance. Nixon and his 
chief foreing policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, had little interest in Latin Ameri- 
ca and began to distance themselves from the more reprehensible of the re- 
gian's rulers. According to Nixon's formula, the dictators would get only a 
handshake. A warm embrace would be reserved for the region's dernocrats, the 
true friends of the United States. 
Under increasing interna1 and externa1 pressure, Somoza decided to repeat 
a move used successfully by his father in the 1940s. He called on the Conservati- 
ves to join his Liberal party in revamping the political system. The Conservati- 
ves, under Fernando Aguero, behaved just like they had under Chamorro in 
1947 and 1950: they jumped at the opportunity and signed a pact with Somoza's 
Liberal party in March 197 1 which guaranteed them a share of the seats in the 
legislature, judgeships and positions on the municipal co~nci ls .~ '  The dea1 be- 
came known as ccKupia Kumin, the Misquito words for aOne single heart, with 
which Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the young editor of La Prensa and son of the 
27. The text of the legislation is in La Gaceta/Diario Oficial, vol. 7 5 ,  N o .  207 (Sept. 11, 
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earlier Conservative leader, baptized and ridiculed the agreement. Kupia Kumi 
was followed by a legislative decision to hold elections in February 1972 for a 
constitutional convention which would, in turn, choose the theree man junta 
that would run the country unti1 a new president, elected under the new consti- 
tution, took office in January 1974. Somoza resigned from the presidency and 
turned power over to the junta on which Aguero sat. 
In December 1972, an earthquake devastated Managua. Anastasi0 Somoza 
Debayle, as Commander of the Guardia, declared himself head of the National 
Emergency Committee (Coordinador de la Junta de Reconstruccion) to handle 
relief and reconstruction in the Managua area. He had himself named head of 
the Committee and brought in the entire cabinet to assist him, thus creating a 
parallel government structure which had no immediate responsiblity to the 
governing junta.28 Aguero, the Conservative member of the junta, resigned in 
protest, but a more pliant Conservative was named to replace him. U.S. ambas- 
sadqr Turner Shelton, one of Somoza's most fervent defenders, strongly sup- 
ported request by the Nicaraguan governm'ent for emergency aid. Within eight 
months of the earthquake, the Nicaraguan government had negotiated loans 
with foreing credit institutions worth approximately $100 milion to finance the 
cleaning up operations, reconstruct the infrastructure, and reactivate the eco- 
nomy. Other funds were allocated in the national budget itself. And with Somo- 
za back in the presidential office after an unopposed campaing in 1974, the way 
was prepared for a veritable orgy of corruption and open, cynical manipulation 
of the system for the enrichment of Somoza Debayle and his cronies beyond 
anything perpetrated by any previous Nicaraguan ruler. It was as if Somoza had 
thrown all caution to the wind, defying the domestic opposition, the United 
States, and the rest of the world to stop him if they dared. 
The legitimacy the Somoza dynasty, built up with great care by Somoza 
Garcia and Luis Somoza, careful to accommodate the sensibilities of the U.S. 
government and operate within the rules of formal democracy and electoral 
politics, eroded rapidly in the face of Somoza Debayle's civic depravity. The 
FSLN1s campaign picked up steam after some successful operations in Managua 
and the interior in 1974 and 1975, while the business community, long the 
dynasty's major civil bulwark, looked with fear and anger at the rapidly growing 
empire of the Somozas that became engorged on the reconstruction of Mana- 
gua. In the United States, concern with human rights violations in all of Latin 
America emerged as one of the most passionately espoused issues in the Con- 
gress. Nicaragua began to get its share of accusations as the Somoza regime 
responsed to increasing dissidence with brutal tortures and political persecu- 
sion. The election of Jimmy Carter in 1986 signaled that U.S. concern for hu- 
man rights had an advocate in the White House itself. 
By the end of 1978, the administration in Washington knew that Somoza's 
days were numbered unless the U.S. tried to do what it did in 19 12 and 1927. But 
this was out of the question. The struggle against Somoza involved, on the one 
hand, an enraged populace that had suffered enough corruption, brutality, and 
injustice, a population that had witnessed enough hypocrisy from its rulers and 
more than enough repression of its advocates. On the other hand, it involved a 
vol. 
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set of countries, in Latin America and Europe, willing to assist in the overthrow 
of the regime once and for all. If the United States had decided to act on behalf 
of Somoza, it would have done so completely alone and in defense of a regime 
which had very little interna1 support and no international support outside, 
perhaps, of Paraguay. Not even the military dictatorships in Guatemala and El 
Salvador were willing to stretch a helping hand to Somoza; they had suficient 
problems of their own holding on to power. 
The policy debate in the Carter administration over how to handle the 
collapse of the Somoza regime reflected virtually the same set of priorities and 
calculations that had infused the policy formulation process since the first inter- 
vention in Nicaraguan affairs in 1909: the global perspective of U.S. interests, 
the presumed responsibilities of the United States in the region, and the likely 
implications of any decision for the broader foreign policies of the government. 
Two conjunctural considerations framed the debate: the efficacy of the human 
rights policy in relations with the Soviet Union, and a determination not to 
repeat the supposed mistakes made by the Eiseonhower administration in nego- 
tiating the end of the Batista regime in Cuba twenty years earlier. These two 
considerations, together with the fact that the nations of Latin America were 
more united in their determination to push Somoza from power as soon as 
possible than they had been on any issue in inter-American politics since the 
Caribbean legion had urged the United States to take the lead in supporting 
democratic regimes in the region at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of 
the 1960s. All of these factors pushed the Carter administration to assume an 
active role in getting Somoza to leave Nicaragua. The only countervailing force 
was the insistent warning on the right that failure to support Somoza, a loyal 
friend in the struggle against communism, would play into the hands of hostile 
forces. None of these considerations took Nicaragua into account nor attemp- 
ted to weigh policy options in the light of the legacy of U.S. relations with 
Nicaragua in the twentieth century. The result war a clear policy put into effect 
in a hesitant manner with little public notice: the United Stated would not save 
Somoza nor could it get credit for forcing him from p o ~ e r . ~ ~  
V. Revolution and Democracy after 1979 
The overthrow of the Somocista regime in 1979 did not end the debate 
about democracy in Nicaragua by any means. To the extent that the Sandinista 
Front for National Liberation took effective control of the new revolutionary 
state, other groups within the Nicaraguan polity felt left out and began to enga- 
ge in active opposition to the revolutionary government and its policies. The 
United States, on the other hand, could not remain indifferent to the course of 
events in Nicaragua. Under President Carter, the United States government 
agreed to provide economic assitance (to the private sector primarily) and at- 
tempted to engage in a correct dialogue with the new revolutionary govern- 
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ment. But events in neighboring El Salvador, where the strength of the insur- 
gent Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) threatened another 
revolutionary regime in Central America, put the U.S. administration on guard. 
Nicaragua again became a country within a region where U.S. security con- 
cerns ovenvhelmed any policy considerations about development, reform, or 
even democracy. 
The U.S. election campaign of 1980 dragged Nicaragua back into its tradi- 
tional role of a geo-strategic issue for U.S. policymakers and politicians. As 
during the early part of the 20th century, Nicaragua again was reduced to a 
place on the map that could not be allowed to ((fall)) into the hands of an extra- 
continental, hostile power and whose ccfalling)) had nothing or very little to do 
with interna1 factors it might have been caused by and could be prevented by 
externa1 forces alone. The elimination of both the Shah in Iran and Somoza in 
Nicaragua became an important topic of Ronald Reagan's campaign for the 
presidency. President Carter stood accused of cdosingn those two countries by 
not doing enough to help their erstwhile leaders and by insisting on a respect 
for human rights that undermined the old regimes's strength. While Iran pro- 
bably could not be returned to the fold by the forceful reinstalation of a pro-U.S. 
regime, Nicaragua, much closer and much more vulnerable to U.S. pressure, 
seemed an ideal place for Washington to work its will. 
As explained in the Sante Fe Memorandum that summarized the Republi- 
cans' campaign interest in the hemisphere, Central America was a region under 
attack. The Soviet Union and its allies had taken advantage of U.S. weakness to 
penetrate into our very backyard. It was time to strengthen the nation's will. To 
show the Soviets and the rest of the world that the United States was prepared to 
reassert its dominance and stop and even reverse the falling dominos, Central 
America, because of its proximity, would be the ideal place to begin with a 
quick vict01-y.30 
The Reagan administration lost little time in putting together a policy to- 
wards Central America that sought the military defeat of the FMLN in El Salva- 
dor and the overthrow or replacement of the FSLN government in Nicaragua. 
The second objective was never spelled out publicy in such terms. After all, 
Washington maintained diplomatic relations with Managua during all the Rea- 
gan years and insisted that it only wanted the development of a full-fledged 
democracy of a Western type in Nicaragua. Still, the extraordinary efforts made 
by the Reagan administration before Congress to secure funding for the coun- 
ter- revolutionary forces operating out of Honduras make it clear that the real 
objective was to achieve some sort of military victory. On the other side, the 
Sandinista government perceived U.S. objectives in similar terms and procee- 
ded to gear up its forces for a protracted and costly war. 
Within this confrontational environment, the space for political expression 
and competition within Nicaragua became more restricted. The government of 
Nicaragua had to face both the military attacks of the contras and the severe 
consequences of the cut-off of U.S. and multilateral aid. The establishment of 
the military draft proved particularly unpopular, while the economic decline 
that set in after 1983 made it increasingly difficult to maintain social services 
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and economic subsidies that constituted the basis of the revolution's redistribu- 
tive and development policies. Politically, the triumphant revolutionary coali- 
tion had begun to break apart by 1982 and those who were never much convin- 
ced about the Sandinistas' intentions now saw a chance to make common cause 
with the United States. 
The Sandinistas tried to defuse the growing crisis by seeking a political 
arrangement with the United States through talks with Washington oficials 
held in Manzanillo, Mexico, during 1984. But these conversations led to not- 
hing; on the contrary, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, 
Thomas Enders, who thought that a negotiated settlement was possible, was 
sacked and replaced by Elliot Abrams, a hard-liner who identified totally with 
President Reagan's beliefs about the inherent evilness of Sandinismo. Within 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas attempted a rapprochement with the interna1 oppo- 
sition by renewing their promise to hold elections by 1985. Such a promise had 
been made in 198 1 and formed part of the Sandinista pledge to take Nicaragua 
down the road of pluralist democracy, a mixed economy, and international 
non-alignment. 
Ever since 198 1 ,  the Sandinista party had held conversations with the other 
political parties of Nicaragua in order to reach agreements on the organization 
of the electoral process. As a result of these contacts, legislation was passed by 
the Nicaraguan legislature in 1983 and 1984 that set the basis for the holding of 
elections for president and a constituent assembly in November 1984. The su- 
pervision of the electoral process would be in the hands of a five person Supre- 
me Electoral Council with opposition party representation, remarkably similar 
to arrengements made between the Liberals and the Conservatives during the 
Somoza years. The participating political parties were defined as contenders for 
power and would be alloted material resources by the state in order to carry out 
their ~ampains .~ '  
The response to the electoral initiative was mixed. Within Nicaragua, a 
nurnber of parties decided not to participate, even though they conducted ex- 
tensive negotiations with the Sandinista Front unti1 only a few weeks before the 
election itself. One group of opposition parties and business associations, the 
Coordinadora Democratica, put forth the candidacy of Arturo Cruz, but he 
dropped out of the race when conversations in Rio de Janeiro with Sandinista 
represelitatives broke down. The presidential candidate of the Independent Li- 
beral Party, Virgilio Godoy, also withdrew although many of his party's candida- 
tes continued to campaign. 
In the cases of both Arturo Cruz and Virgilio Godoy, the United States 
exercised strong pressure to achieve their withdrawal. By doing so, Washington 
sought to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process and of the entire 
political system. However, seven parties remained in the running, three of them 
to the right of the Sandinista Front and three to its left. The results gave the 
Sandinista Front the Presidency of the Republic and three quarters of the seats 
in the National Assembly in elections which were remarkable for their calm and 
high voter turn-out. Still, the U.S. government refused to acknowledge that 
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elections in Nicaragua had produced a legitimate government. The elections 
themselves were dismissed as (cfarcical)) by Washington. After 1984, the United 
States increased the pressure on Nicaragua by openly seeking assistance in the 
Congress for the contra forces, which by now had been indentified as ((freedom 
fighters)) and likened to the Founding Fathers of the United States. It was clear 
that Washington's concern for democracy in Nicaragua was a function of its 
desire to rid itself of the Sandinistas. 
The role of democracy in Reagan's Central American policy grew over 
time. At the outset, it seemed an afterthought or a cynical use of rhetoric to 
appease domestic liberal critics. By the end of the decade, it was the driving 
force behind the administration's policy in the hemi~phere .~~  The shift must be 
attributed to a sereis of miscalculations by the administration of U.S. public 
opinion, of the expression of that opinion through the congres, and of the 
consistent and stubborn pressure of our European allies. The decline of the 
Soviet Union, the accommodation of the Sandinistas to their geopolitical rea- 
lity, and the growing determination of the nations in the region to end the 
bloodshed also gave democracy greater weight in the policy calcuations of the 
U.S. government. 
The Reagan administration thought it could apply force as it chose in El 
Salvador in its quest for a quick, uplifting victory. As soon as armed Creen 
Berets were shown on the evening news, the public indicated its bipartisan 
opposition to any adventure that threatened to escalate out of control - what 
came to be called the Vietnam syndrome. The congressional counterpart of this 
phenomenon was the reduction in the executive's leverage over the policy pro- 
cess in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam and Watergate which strengthened 
the disposition and the capacity of fairly small groups of legislators to question 
the legitimacy of the executive's policy and its interpretation of events in the re- 
g i ~ n . ~ ~  
The varying interpretations hinged on the relative importance qttributed to 
interna1 or externa1 factors as causes of the unrest in the region. Reagan and his 
senior advisers were convinced the problems had externa1 causes and would be 
solved once those causes were removed. Liberal opposition could be i g n ~ r e d . ~ ~  
What could not be ignored was the fact that most of our allies disagreed with the 
U.S. government's official explanation of what was happening in Central Ameri- 
ca, rejected its manichean association of the struggle in El Salvador and Nicara- 
gua with their security, and insisted with growing conviction that a negotiated 
settlement was   re fera ble.^^ In each of these factors, the concept of democracy 
32. See the chapter in this volurne by Thornas Carothers and his excellent new book, forthco- 
rning. 
33. The irnpact of these factors on U.S. policy has been discussed in rny cEEUU y la crisis en 
Centroarnerica: una perspectiva histórica)), in Juan Del Aguila, Realidades y Posibilidades de las 
Relaciones entre Espaiia y América en 10s Ochenta (Madrid: ICI, 1984). 
34. The debate over U.S. policy has produced a flood of books and articles. For a sarnple that 
defines the terrns of the debate, see .Howard Wiarda, In Search o f  Policy: The United States and Latin 
America (Washington, DC: AEI, 1984); Richard Fagen, Forging Peace: The Challenge o f  Central Ameri- 
ca (NY: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Richard E. Feinberg, Central America: International Dimensions of 
the Crisis (NY: Holmes & Meier, 1982); and Robert Wesson, ed., Communism in Central America and 
the Caribbean (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982). 
35. On the European role, see Jordi Solé Tura, et. al., Las relaciones entre Espaiia y América 
Central (1976-1989) (Barcelona: AIETI-CIDOB, 1989); Eusebio Mujal-León, Europe and Central Ame- 
as a goal, as an objective of policy was crucial. In El Salvador, it became impor- 
tant because it was notoriously absent from the concerns of the government we 
supported there. In Nicaragua, it was important because our support of the 
contra, with remnants of Somoza's Guardia Nacional prominent in its leaders- 
hip, seemed inconsistent with the achievement of that goal. In addition, from 
the very beginning, the Sandinistas appeared sensitive to the power of demo- 
cracy as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the United States, with the NATO 
nations, with own opposition, and with the nations of Latin America. All of these 
factors kept democracy on the table for discussion as a policy goal and kept 
increasing it as a priority in the policy process. 
The increase in the levels of military confrontation in Nicaragua (and El 
Salvador) also engaged the attention of a number of Latin American countries, 
four of which came together to form the Contadora Group. The Contadora 
peace initiative finally put together a draft treaty by the middle of 1986 but the 
Central American countries, which had participated in the discussions over the 
draft, never got around to signing. The United States government, which gave 
formal support to the Contadora initiative, did not like the form which the final 
draft took, especially because it recognized the existing governments, set limits 
on foreing troops, arms shipments, and military maneuvers and bases in the 
region, and demanded an end to economic sanctions (which the United States 
had imposed on N i ~ a r a g u a ) . ~ ~  
Although Contadora was stillborn, it laid the basis for another regional 
peace initiative introduced by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica in early 1987. 
The Arias Plan succeeded to some extent precisely because it was not as ambi- 
tious as the Contadora Plan; it centered on the political aspects of the problem 
(dialogue, amnesties, elections) and left out the military components, which 
would have affected the United States most directly. Even though Washington 
described the Arias Plan as ((flawed),, it was embraced by the other Central 
American presidents when they met in Guatemala in mid-1987 and took shape 
in succeeding meetings. 
The Arias Plan bore its most immediate and important fruits in the case of 
Nicaragua. The agreement signed by the government of Nicaragua and the con- 
tras (by then formally known as the Nicaraguan Resistance) at Sapoa in March 
1988 committed both sides to initiate negotiations for a long-lasting solution 
that included the freeing of political prisoners in Nicaragua, the disarmament 
of the contra fighters, and a general amnesty for everyone who had left the 
country for political reasons. At the same time, support in the U.S. Congress for 
assistance to the contras waned in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal and 
President Reagan cut a dea1 with the Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, that 
included tacit support for a negotiated settlement to the Nicaraguan war. From 
that moment on, the prospects for the success of the Arias peace initiative in the 
cause of Nicaragua looked especially good. 
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The government of Nicaragua also was desperate for an end to the war and 
the economic sanctions that had destroyed the promises of the revolution in the 
fields of education, health, and employrnent. For its part, the Soviet Union made 
it clear to Nicaragua in October 1988 that further assistance for Nicaragua's 
development was predicated on a resolution of its differences with the United 
States. Thus, when the five Central American presidents met in El Salvador in 
February, 1989, President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua made specific commit- 
ments to assure the complete respect for democratic principles and procedures 
in his country as part of an overall political settlement. He offered to advance 
the date of presidential and legislative elections from November to February 
1990, he promised to reform electoral legislation to satisfy all the political par- 
ties, and he announced that international observers from the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States would be invited to observe the electo- 
ral process from beginning to end. In exchange for these commitments, the 
Central American presidents promised to put together within ninety days a plan 
to demobilize the contra forces. 
At this time, the U.S. policy towards Nicaragua shifted noticeably. Congress 
allowed further non-military assistance for the contras on condition the admi- 
nistration pressure contra leaders to return to Nicaragua and participate in the 
elctoral process. Bush argued that the efforts to democratize the Sandinistas 
required the armed threat of the contra. But, the events in Eastern Europe 
made the Soviet menace pale as an argument in congress and the spreading 
crisis in the Savings and Loan industry made spending money on the contra 
seem frivolous. To assure ((a level playing field),, the U.S. government assigned 
funds for the opposition parties and groups through the National Endowment 
for Democracy and encouraged private citizens to help out in this new crusade 
against the Sandinistas. Once a viable opponent to the FSLN was organized in 
the form of the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), Washington did little to hide 
its electoral preference. The fourteen parties that made up a fractious UNO 
stretched from the Communists on the left to a faction of the Conservatives on 
the right but Mrs. Violeta Chamorro, the presidential nominee of UNO, was 
deemed a strong candidate to face incumbent President Ortega. Mrs. Chamorro 
was received by President Bush at the White House and she toured a number of 
U.S. cities with large Nicaraguan emigre populations. 
Once the campaign got undenvay, it became clear that the underlying issue 
was the United States. The Sandinistas identified Mrs. Chamorro as the candida- 
te of the Bush administration and criticized her willingness to work with contra 
leaders who had returned to the country. Her promise to end the military draft 
and dismantle the economic policies of the Sandinista government left her 
open to the accusation of being a contra herself. Mrs. Chamorro, in turn, accu- 
sed the Sandinistas of provoking the United States and turning their backs on 
the Western democracies that had helped them in their struggle against the 
Somoza dictatorship. 
Once committed to the electoral option, it became clear that the Sandinis- 
tas would seek a working relationship with the United States to wind down the 
war and gain access to the credit of the multilateral lending agencies. The same 
events in Eastern Europe that made them appear less threating to the United 
States implied a decreasing commitment of the Soviet bloc countries in Nicara- 
gua's development projects and its military defense, making them more vulne- 
rable to externa1 pressure. In the case of UNO, its strong ties with the principal 
business groups of Nicaragua effectively mandated a normalization of relations 
with the United States in order to gain access to U.S. markets for sugar, beef, 
and coffee. Business groups also pressured for normalization of relations with 
Nicaragua's Central American neighbors. 
On February 25,1990, Nicaraguans went to the polls to elect a government 
which would chart a new course for their country. They had heart campaign 
speeches, watched television debates, participated in numerous rallies and 
street demonstrations, and discussed among themselves what the best choices 
might be. During the entire campaign, the country was invaded by hundreds of 
observers from the UN and the OAS, as well as numerous private groups and 
organizations from the United States, Latin America, and Western Europe. Alt- 
hough some argued that Nicaragua's sovereignty was compromised by the very 
visible role of foreign political actors in the electoral process, such a presence 
also helped to assure a high level of participation and to legitimize the results 
both within and outside Nicaragua. 
The election of February 25, 1990, proved a turning point in Nicaraguan 
political development. After ten years of confrontation with the United States, 
the people of Nicaragua were tired and poverty-stricken. They knew that to end 
the war and initiate some sort of economic recovery, they had to come to terms 
with the United States. The Sandinistas had recognized this for some time. The 
election results left no doubt that Mrs. Chamorro was seen as the political lea- 
der with the best credentials to begin a new relationship with Washington. The 
Nicaraguan people did not turn their backs on the Sandinistas strictly out of 
ideological convictions. Mrs. Chamorro got over 54 % of the vote to Daniel 
Ortega's 41 %. In the legislative branch of government, the UNO coalition en- 
ded up with 51 seats to 39 for the FSLN.37 
The results surprised most observers. President Ortega commented after 
the vote that the Nicaraguans had gone to the polls ccwith a gun to their heads)). 
It was not the first time they had done so. The transition to democracy will not 
be easy. The Sandinista Front remains the strongest single political organiza- 
tion within the country, with a solid voting bloc in the Assembly and considera- 
ble support among peasants and workers. UNO, on the other hand, was created 
with a purely electoral objetive. Now that it is in government there is no assu- 
rance that it will remain united, even after changing its name from Unión Na- 
cional Opositora to Unión Nacional Organizada. For example, Mrs. Chamorro 
has no party afFiliation of her own nor does she exercise any special authority 
over the remaining contra forces. Ironically, her government will need the 
support of the Sandinistas more than from her own political following during 
the difficult transition from war to peace as the contra forces are demobilized. 
She will also need the strong economic and financial support of the United 
States to ensure that her promises of a better future for all Nicaraguans do not 
remain a purely electoral ploy. The decision in May 1990 by the U.S. congress to 
reject President Bush's proposa1 for emergency aid to Nicaragua is not encoura- 
ging. 
What is really at stake is a new political system for Nicaragua. For the first 
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time in the 20th century, all political forces in Nicaragua, large and small, made 
their case before the Nicaraguan people and sought their votes. For the first 
time, a democractically elected head of state turned over the office to a demo- 
cratically elected candidate hom the opposition. For the firs time, no one (ex- 
cept the more recalcitrant contra forces) has denied the legitimacy of the new 
government. The 1990 election in Nicaragua is the closest that country has ever 
come to practicing the basic principles of pluralist democracy, albeit within the 
worst possible social and economic conditions and under severe externa1 pres- 
sure. If the U.S. government wants to claim credit for promoting democracy ia 
Nicaragua, it should do so with extreme caution. 
The United States intervened in Nicaragua politically and militarily at least 
once in each of the first four decades of this century to set up a democracy, but 
the end result was nearly half a century of Somocista dictatorship. In the 1980s 
the United States intervened again in defense of democracy, but the result is a 
country with a devastated economy and deep social and political divisions. It is 
tempting to suggest that if democracy does flourish in Nicaragua during the 
succeeding decades, it will come to pass not because of the United States but 
more likely in spite of it. The United States has been remarkably unsuccessful in 
its efforts to implant its special version of pluralist democracy in Nicaragua. So 
startling is the historical record, that it is tempting to suggest, further, that 
democracy in Nicaragua will have a better chance if the United States lets it 
develop on Nicaragua's t ems  rather than trying to dictate and impose its own 
version afor export onlyn. But the same historical record suggests that the Uni- 
ted States has been a critica1 actor in Nicaraguan politics for eighty years. There 
is no reason to believe that it will end that role in the near future. The question 
which the United States and Nicaragua must face together is how the role of the 
United States can be made constructive and ~ositive in the effort to create a 
democratic and just society in Nicaragua. It is a question that will not be easy to 
answer. 
